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Concepts and Practices of Cooperative Security:  
Building Trust in the International System 
 
Vincent Charles Keating, School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University 
Nicholas J Wheeler, Institute for Conflict, Cooperation, and Security, University of Birmingham 
This is a pre-print of a chapter published by Lexington Books in The Legacy of the Cold War: 
Perspectives on Security, Cooperation, and Conflict, which is available here: 
https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780739187890   
Introduction 
The central issue for both theorists and practitioners of security cooperation is how to cope with 
the security dilemma created by the condition of “international anarchy,” (defined here as a global 
political system with no central authority to regulate its components).  The security dilemma 
originates in the inescapable uncertainty that confronts governments about the motives and 
intentions of those that have the capability to harm them.1  This chapter will consider how the 
security dilemma can be overcome in ways that promote cooperation and even trust, mitigating or 
transcending the international uncertainty that can otherwise severely inhibit interstate 
cooperation. 
Theorists have identified several possible cooperative mechanisms to alleviate the problems 
associated with sustaining cooperation under the condition of international anarchy, such as 
collective security, common security, security regimes, cooperative security, and security 
communities.  However, the potential of these mechanisms to transform interstate relationships 
has not been fully grasped either theoretically or practically because insufficient attention has 
been given to the role of trust.  On the one hand, security regime theories have ignored the 
possibility of trust between states.  On the other hand, although security community theorists 
have recognized trust as one of the variables in sustaining peaceful interstate relations, they have 
not explained how actors overcome suspicion and mistrust to establish trusting relationships.  
Additionally, they have not addressed the essential question of what role trust plays in the 
maintenance of security communities.  If we are interested in developing policies that might foster 
the growth of new security communities, we need to correct this theoretical deficit. 
This chapter argues that there are two mechanisms to create the trust necessary for the 
development of a security community, Charles Osgood’s GRIT strategy and a unilateral ‘leap of 
trust.’  Both of these, however, initially require elites to develop security dilemma sensibility, or 
                                                     
1. This definition is in Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World 
Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 5.  Compare with the standard definition developed by Robert Jervis, 
Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976): 66, who 
defines the security dilemma as “the unintended and undesired consequences of actions meant to be defensive.”   
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the knowledge that their security is not independent from the security of other states, and 
therefore seemingly hostile actions on the part of others might be attributable to a real fear that 
they have of possible malevolent motives and intentions on the part of their own state.  Finally, 
the stability of security communities is fundamentally linked to the presence of embedded trust 
among the states in the community, or where trust moves beyond the elite leadership in states to 
trust between the societies themselves.   
To defend this position, the chapter first explores various conceptualizations of security and 
defines the key terminology.  It then shows how the security dilemma impedes cooperation in 
international society.  The third section, drawing on Barry Buzan’s notion of a security complex, 
elucidates the plurality of possible security conditions under anarchy.  It distinguishes security 
regimes from security communities, showing how regimes serve to mitigate competition whereas 
communities can eliminate the threat or the use of force in interstate relations.  The fourth section 
explores how security communities move beyond security regimes by making war ‘unthinkable’ 
between the states in the community.  The fifth section defends the central role of trust in both 
the creation and sustenance of security communities. The final section then compares European 
integration as an example of a ‘mature’ security community with the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an example of an emerging security community.  It emphasizes the 
catalytic effect of the post-World War II Franco-German reconciliation and the creation of 
embedded trust between the two states, arguing that a similar embedded trust is needed ensure a 
long-term stability in ASEAN.  
Conceptualizing Security 
In the range of security relationships, common security, collective security, and cooperative 
security share sufficient similarities to be subsumed under the larger category of security regimes, 
making it possible to simplify our typology and to explore the relationship solely between security 
regimes and security communities. 
Common security is based on the premise that international security should be pursued through 
cooperative mechanisms with those states that might be actual or potential threats.  Whereas 
national defense is concerned to provide security against others, common security is security with 
others.2  Collective security, on the other hand, is based on the principle that the members of a 
collectivity should regard an attack upon one state as an attack upon all.  The system works by 
combining preponderant power against a potential aggressor state where none of the members 
know in advance who this might be.  In an ideal world, the collectivity would deter any such 
aggression, but if deterrence fails, the collectivity would then be able to bring such coercive power 
to bear against the aggressor state – ultimately including the use of military force – that any war 
would soon be ended and peace restored.  Because of the confidence invested in this form of 
                                                     
2
 Ken Booth, New Thinking About Strategy and International Security (London: Harper Collins, 1991): 335-76. 
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collective deterrent, individual states would presumably not amass their own military stockpiles 
beyond a limited level.3  
Cooperative security is a more nebulous concept whose meaning has changed substantially over 
time.  John Steinbrunner, for example, used the term in the immediate post-Cold War period to 
define a series of measures “designed to control the circumstances of military deployment in 
advance of any actual use... by enforcing rules about the size of forces and by requiring 
transparency, making it difficult for states to organize an offensive operation.”4  In 1994, the then 
Australian foreign minister, Gareth Evans, developed the concept by claiming that cooperative 
security possesses utility as “the language itself encourages an open and constructive mindset … 
[that] tends to connote consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than 
deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and 
interdependence rather than unilateralism.”5   
Similarly, Barry Posen and Andrew Ross explained that the distinguishing feature of cooperative 
security is “the proposition that peace is effectively indivisible.”6  This overlaps closely with the 
notion of collective security, but Posen and Ross claimed that what distinguished it was its reliance 
on liberal institutions and values.7  Ralph Emmers shared this perspective, arguing that cooperative 
security should be defined as “an alternative to balance of power practice.”8  He argued that it 
differs from collective security in that it “lacks the vehicle of economic or military sanctions”, and 
rather “relies on the promotion of standard international norms and principles to be adhered to 
by the various participants...[and] aim[s] to develop a ‘habit of dialogue’ amongst the participants 
and to promote confidence-building and possibly preventive diplomacy measures.”9   
As we can see, the definition of cooperative security varies widely, leading Merje Kuus to conclude 
that “the conceptual solidity of cooperative security is suspect.”10  Nevertheless, most writers 
identify a commonality within the definitions of cooperative security involving a commitment to 
the diplomatic transformation of traditional balance of power considerations. 
For the purposes of simplification, the above types of security systems can be identified as sub-
species of security regimes because they accord a central role to common norms and principles as 
regulators of state conduct.  Having identified various forms of security regimes, we are faced with 
a question:  what are the processes by which states enter into security regimes, and crucially, how 
                                                     
3
 Inis L Claude, Swords into Ploughshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 3rd ed. (London: 
U.P., 1965): 227.  See also Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: 174. 
4
 John Steinbrunner, "Making War Difficult: Cooperative Security in the Middle East," Middle East Report 177 (July - 
August, 1992): 20. 
5
 Gareth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict," Foreign Policy 96 (Autumn, 1994): 7. 
6
 Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security 21 (Winter, 
1996): 23. 
7
 Ibid.: 24-25. 
8
 Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and ARF (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003): 4.  
9
 Ibid.: 50.  
10
 Merje Kuus, "Toward Cooperative Security? International Integration and the Construction of Security in Estonia," 
Millennium - Journal of International Studies 31 (March, 2002): 300. 
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might these regimes be transformed into security communities?  In order to understand these 
processes, it is first necessary to discuss a fundamental barrier to achieving any type of security 
cooperation in world politics, namely, the security dilemma.  
The Security Dilemma 
The term security dilemma was first coined by John Herz, who wrote in 1950 that:  
Wherever . . . anarchic society has existed…there has arisen what may be called the 
‘security dilemma’ of men, or groups, or their leaders.  Groups or individuals living in 
such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from 
being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals.  
Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more 
power in order to escape the impact of the power of others.  This, in turn, renders the 
others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst.  Since none can ever 
feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and 
the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.11  
 
The security dilemma promotes insecurity because “the existence of weapons in the hands of one 
state can provoke at least uncertainty and possibly real fear in others even when those weapons 
are not intended to be used except for self-protection.”12  State leaders are confronted with a 
dilemma in which they are faced with two options, neither of which is satisfactory.  A state can 
choose either not to arm itself, with the risk of being taken advantage of by any potential 
aggressors, or to arm itself, with the risk of decreasing the security of non-aggressor states that in 
turn will arm themselves, decreasing the security of all states.13   
The explanation of how the security dilemma affects outcomes between states varies among 
International Relations theorists.  Offensive realists believe that, given the inescapable uncertainty 
confronted by states, the only prudent strategy to maintain security is the maximization of power, 
including military power.14  Defensive realists, however, have argued that such worst-case thinking 
potentially leads to suboptimal outcomes if other states are non-aggressive.15  Any increase in the 
security of one state will often lead to a decrease in the security of others, who will be expected to 
respond in kind.16   
                                                     
11
 John H Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," World Politics 2 (January, 1950): 157. 
12
 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: 1. 
13
 These are ideal types at polar ends of a continuum.  In practice, decision-makers often seek to pursue policies that 
combine these options.  The classic discussion on this topic is Jervis, Perception and Misperception: 58-113.  
14
 See John J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2001) 
15
 See Charles L Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics:  The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010) 
16
 E. B. Montgomery, "Breaking out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty," 
International Security 31 (Fall, 2006): 151-52. 
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Robert Jervis called this situation the spiral model, wherein mutual hostility arises between two 
states that are both acting, at least in their own leaders’ minds, defensively.17  Building on Jervis, 
Charles Glaser has contended that three types of costs are incurred from such spirals.  First, a 
spiral can set in motion a process that reduces the military capability for any state to defend itself 
because of an increase in the overall number of offensive weapons.  Second, it can increase the 
value that other states place on expansion since the elimination of potential rivals is one way to 
increase their own security when they feel threatened.  Third, it wastes money and resources that 
could have otherwise been put to use for other purposes.18 
In game theory,19 scholars often link the security dilemma to both the prisoners’ dilemma and the 
stag hunt.20  In both of these games the optimal outcome for states with peaceful or defensive 
intentions is cooperation.  However, the negative consequences arising from the risk of defection 
should the first state decide to co-operate leads to the defection of both states to avoid the worst 
outcome - that one state cooperates and the other defects.  But since mutual defection is an 
inferior outcome to mutual cooperation, it is important to understand how states might overcome 
these pernicious security dilemma dynamics.   
Jervis suggested that cooperation can be achieved by increasing incentives to cooperate, 
decreasing the incentives for defecting, or increasing each state’s expectation that the other will 
cooperate.21  However, it still often proves very difficult to establish and maintain cooperation 
because mistakes in the perception of the intentions of others in the military security realm can 
sometimes lead to disastrous consequences.22 
Empirical evidence, however, suggests that cooperation is sometimes possible under anarchy.   As 
Jervis pointed out, “The central question is not, ‘Why do wars occur?’ but ‘Why do wars not occur 
more often?’”23  To begin to address this question, the next section explores the different types of 
security relationships that can exist between states that can mitigate the security dilemma. 
Security Complexes and Regimes 
Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver defined a security complex as a “set of units whose major processes 
of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot 
                                                     
17
 Jervis, Perception and Misperception: 75.  Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics 40 
(April, 1988): 337-39. 
18
 Charles L Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics 50 (October, 1997): 175-77. 
19
 Game theory attempts to capture behavior in strategic situations, where an individual's success in making choices 
depends on the choices of others. 
20
 A stag hunt is a two-player game in which cooperation leads to mutual benefit for both players.  Should one player 
decide to defect, this leads to a lesser benefit to the defector and no benefit to the cooperator.  Should both players 
decide to defect, it leads to lesser benefits for both players.  A prisoners’ dilemma differs crucially in changing the 
payoff structure.  Cooperation still leads to mutual benefit, but defecting gives an even larger benefit for the defector 
and leads to the largest possible loss for the cooperator, whereas mutual defection leads to lesser benefits for both.  
21
 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30 (January, 1978): 171. 
22
 Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization 36 (Spring, 1982): 358-59. 
23
 Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," World Politics 38 (October, 
1985): 58. 
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reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.”24  In other words, a security complex 
is any set of states that, due to geographical or technological reasons (for instance, the existence 
of long-range weapons), find that their search for security cannot be accomplished without taking 
into account the security considerations of the other states in the complex.  In an earlier work, 
Buzan, Waever, and Jaap de Wilde had called this condition 'security interdependence’ and they 
had argued that it would be more intense among the states in a security complex than in the 
relationship between states inside the security complex and those outside of it.25 
Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde described a spectrum of possible outcomes within a security 
complex.  At one end is conflict formation, a situation which can develop out of two possible 
pathways.  First, conflict stems from territorial disputes, ethnic/religious conflicts, and competition 
for prestige and status among one or more revisionist states.  The second motor of conflict is the 
spiral model where states have peaceful/defensive intent but are perceived by rivals as acting 
offensively.  The next major point on Buzan’s spectrum is security regimes, where states still see 
each other as potential threats but have created a set of norms that lead to mutual reassurance – 
whether this be ‘collective’ or ‘cooperative’ security – thereby mitigating the negative effects of 
security competition. 
The most advanced forms of security cooperation are security communities, where states no 
longer expect or prepare for the use of force in relations between each other, and regional 
integration, in which states create a larger single political entity within the international system – 
for example, the unification of the Italian or German states in the 19th century.  Regional 
integration completely eliminates security dilemma dynamics between the members of the 
regional system because it removes the condition of anarchy.26 
Jervis defined a security regime as “those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be 
restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate.”  In his view, the test for the 
presence of such a regime is whether it displays “a form of cooperation that is more than the 
following of short-run self-interest.”27  Since security regimes do not form automatically, Jervis 
posited a number of conditions necessary for their creation.   
First, there must be a great power or powers that want to establish such a regime and all states 
within it must be “reasonably satisfied with the status quo.”  Second, all states must believe that 
all the other members of the regime place a shared value on the creation of the regime.  Third, 
none of the participating states must believe that their security can be provided for by expansion.  
Fourth, the individual pursuit of security and war must be seen as costly.28   
                                                     
24
 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers:  The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003): 44. 
25
 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner; 1998): 11-12. 
26
 Ibid.: 12.  See also Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991): 218-19. 
27
 Jervis, "Security Regimes," 357. 
28
 Ibid.: 360-62. 
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The three types of security practices outlined in the first section – common, collective and 
cooperative – are different types of security regimes.  Common security attempts to build security 
among states, but relies on cooperative mechanisms that can be classified as ‘principles, rules and 
norms.’  Similarly collective security is concerned with creating an institutionalized setting 
whereby deterrence is achieved.  Cooperative security is more difficult to assess because its 
definition is unclear, but though there are references to ‘consultation’ or the ‘promotion of 
standard international norms,’ there is no similar appeal to the notion of a shared identity which is 
necessary for the development of a security community.   
Jervis recognized that security competition could be mitigated by the creation of a security regime.  
However, in his writings on security regimes in the 1980s he was pessimistic about the potentiality 
of regimes to change the outlooks of state leaders who would always remain suspicious about the 
motivations of other states.  This negative assessment rested uneasily with his argument that 
policy-makers could increase their awareness of how the security dilemma fuelled security 
competition in ways that could potentially lead to increased cooperation.29  After the end of the 
Cold War, Jervis’s contention in the 1980s that the dynamics of security competition would lead to 
the erosion and eventual collapse of security regimes30 appeared to be contradicted by his 
embrace of security community theorizing in his 2001 Presidential Address to the American 
Political Science Association.   
Jervis revealed a major change of position by arguing that war between the United States, 
Western Europe and Japan would not occur in the future because they formed a pluralistic 
security community, resulting in a situation where “war is literally unthinkable – i.e., neither the 
publics nor the political elites nor even the military establishments expect war with each other.”31  
Though a bold move given the position he had taken in his previous writings about the possibilities 
for sustaining cooperation under anarchy, Jervis built his ideas about security communities on 
intellectual foundations that had been laid by others in the discipline. 
Security Communities 
Unlike Jervisian security regimes, where force remains a legitimate instrument of statecraft, in a 
security community member states believe that war between them is unthinkable.  According to 
Karl Deutsch, who pioneered the concept, a security community is defined by the following 
features: 1) Peace is predictable between states. 2) A high degree of integration has been 
achieved. 3) The use of force has been delegitimized. 4) No military plans are made against the 
other members of the community; 5) Transparency is extensive and 6) Trust is high.  Accordingly, a 
security community is: 
a group of people which has become ‘integrated’.  By INTEGRATION we mean the 
attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and 
                                                     
29
 ———, "Realism,": 337. 
30
 ———, "From Balance,": 69. ———, "Security Regimes,": 359.  
31
 ———, "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace," American Political Science Review 96 (March, 2002): 1. 
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practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure…dependable expectations 
of ‘peaceful change’ among its population.  By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a 
belief…that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of 
‘peaceful change’.32 
 
Deutsch and his colleagues studied the North Atlantic states in order to find out how states can 
“learn to act together to eliminate war as a social institution.”33  20 out of the 33 cases that they 
used to substantiate their theory were states with ‘Western culture,’ located mostly in Europe,34 
which they believed provided “reasonably good samples of most of the important cultural 
traditions and institutional patterns in western Europe and the North Atlantic area.”35  The 
experience of Western states during the early part of the Cold War also influenced their study, as 
they hoped that their work “could eventually be applied to a wide range of situations, including 
the gap between East and West.”36    
The North Atlantic states37 studied by Deutsch and his team of seven fellow researchers held in 
common the following characteristics: mutual compatibility of values, especially among decision-
makers; strong economic ties and expectations of more; a high level of social, political and cultural 
transactions; institutionalized relationships that promoted mutual responsiveness and mutual 
predictability of behavior; and, most importantly, “dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’.” 
Deutsch recognized that trust was an element in the building of security communities, arguing 
that community depended crucially upon "mutual sympathy and loyalties; of 'we-feeling', trust, 
and mutual consideration."38  However, he and his team never explicitly theorized the role of trust 
in this process.  Instead, they highlighted the role of ‘we-feelings’ in the growth of security 
communities, which they saw as developing from increasing levels of communication between 
decision-makers and societies in the North Atlantic region. 
Deutsch recognized that there was empirical evidence showing that political communities could 
both dissolve and integrate.  However, from the perspective of the mid-1950s, he believed that 
the North Atlantic area had moved a long way towards integration, although it was not yet a fully 
formed security community. Not only did it contain “at least one country that is not entirely 
trusted by some of the others - Germany,”39 but it also contained within itself several security 
                                                     
32
 Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, 
Francis L. Loewenheim and Richard W. Van Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International 
Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957): 5  
33
 Ibid.: 3. 
34
 Ibid.: 16. 
35
 Ibid.: 17. 
36
 Ibid.: 20. 
37
 These included “all countries bordering upon the North Atlantic Ocean or the North Sea, along with their immediate 
land-neighbours in Europe, except the Soviet-dominated countries.” See Ibid.: 10. 
38
 Ibid.: 36. 
39
 Ibid.: 118.   
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communities, and of the “15 conditions…helpful or essential for integration, … 8 are currently high 
for the whole North Atlantic area generally.”40   
Despite their groundbreaking contribution, Deutsch and his colleagues left two key issues 
unexplored in their work.  First, how might two or more adversaries that are intensely suspicious 
of each other start a process of security community building; and second, is trust a key indicator 
that a security community is in existence, or a crucial element in building one?  These omissions 
are important because if security community theorizing is to contribute to developing and 
sustaining cooperation between adversaries, it needs to firstly explain the conditions under which 
mistrustful states can overcome their mutual fear and hostility, and secondly, to establish how far 
trust is a causal mechanism in the building of security communities.  
Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett resurrected Deutsch’s ideas after forty years because they 
believed that new social constructivist ideas41 in International Relations theory provided the 
appropriate tools for developing Deutsch’s framework.  By using a constructivist framework, Adler 
and Barnett drew attention to the centrality of identity and norms in understanding how security 
communities might develop.  In doing so, they identified a pivotal role for trust by arguing that a 
security community was “the deepest expression of trust possible in the international arena.”42   
Adler and Barnett contended that there were three stages in the development of security 
communities.  The first stage occurs with particular initial conditions that lead states to coordinate 
their policies, such as new technological developments or external threats.  These initial 
encounters between states occur to coordinate “Pareto superior” outcomes that can be gained 
from cooperation, but do not necessarily produce relations of trust. At best, as Adler and Barnett 
argue, they can “provide the context for the development of new social bonds.”43   
The second stage is reached when the interactions between states begin to change the way in 
which they identify with each other.  The socialization states experience in such institutional 
settings lead them to cease relating to each other in terms of the ‘rational egoism’44 that 
characterizes interactions in a security regime.  At this stage of the security community’s 
development, the members begin to positively identify with each other’s security and welfare, 
leading to the growth of a new collective identity.  Adler and Barnett argue that a key factor 
fostering this process of trust building and identity change is the ability of actors to participate in 
                                                     
40
 Ibid.: 161. 
41
 Social constructivism is a branch in International Relations theory that examines the way in which the identities and 
interests of states are constituted by shared understandings and expectations.   See, for instance, Alexander Wendt, 
Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
42
 Michael N. Barnett and Emanuel Adler, "Studying Security Communities in Theory, Comparison, and History," in 
Security Communities ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 413-
14. 
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 Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," in Security 
Communities ed. Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 37-38.  
44
 Defined by Jervis as a situation where actors place ‘primary value on [their] own security...and [do] not care much 
about others’ well-being as an end in itself.’ Jervis, "Security Regimes," 364. 
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‘social learning,’ which they define as “an active process of redefinition or reinterpretation or 
reality … on the basis of new causal and normative knowledge.”45   
The third stage occurs when trust and identity become mutually reinforcing.  This situation is 
fundamental to achieving the peaceful change expected to characterize a security community.  
Nevertheless, Adler and Barnett were emphatic that “because a minimal measure of mutual trust 
is needed for a collective identity to develop, trust logically comes prior to identity.”46  In this 
formulation, trust appears as the essential precondition of the new identifications and thus a key 
driver in the process. 
Despite recognizing the centrality of trust to building security communities, Adler and Barnett – 
like Deutsch – did not discuss how states could overcome their fears and mistrust of potential 
enemies in order to start this process of trust-building.  Yet if security community theory is to 
provide a model for building cooperation and trust in regions where mistrust is high, it needs 
supplementing with a conceptual framework that explains how trust might be built between 
existing and potential adversaries. 
Building Trust in World Politics 
Denise Rousseau states that trust is “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.”47 But how 
do actors in relationships of mistrust and suspicion come to believe that the other can be trusted 
such that they are prepared to make themselves vulnerable as a way of signaling their 
trustworthiness?   
Two key approaches can be identified.  First, there are scholars who see the development of trust 
as a purely rational process, similar to cost/benefit calculations.  Russell Hardin considers trust an 
‘encapsulated interest’, or a situation where “I trust you because I think it is in your interest to 
take my interests in the relevant matter seriously.”48  Andrew Kydd similarly argues that the 
building of trust depends upon two actors believing “that the other side prefers mutual 
cooperation to exploiting one’s own cooperation.”49   
The idea of trust-building as a result of cost/benefit analysis is consistent with Jervis’s security 
regime theory, according to which states are rational egoists that do not care about the welfare of 
other states; accordingly, cooperation only occurs when all states judge it to be in their long-term 
self-interest.  Martin Hollis, however, argues conversely that trust cannot emerge from rational 
egoism,50 because ‘philosophical egoists’ can never give up the chance to exploit others if they 
believe it will be to their benefit.  He insists that a trusting relationship requires the eschewing of 
                                                     
45
 Adler and Barnett, "A Framework," 43. 
46
 Ibid.: 45-46.   
47
 D. M. Rousseau, S. B. Sitkin, R. S. Burt and C. Camerer, "Not So Different after All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust," 
Academy of Management Review 23 (July, 1998): 395. 
48
 Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002): 1. 
49
 Andrew H Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005): 6. 
50
 For applicability to International Relations, see Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: 228-57. 
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such benefits in situations where conflicts arise over promises made to each other.51  His concept 
of trust involves two actors doing ‘what is right’ with respect to each other.52   
However, none of this explains how actors in mistrustful relationships come to trust the other’s 
promises in the first place. How, then, can governments mitigate, much less escape, security 
competition?  We argue that this is possible in two stages: first, by realizing that they might be 
trapped in spiraling distrust driven by mutual fear and hostility, and second, by engaging in either 
a GRIT (Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction) strategy or a leap of trust.   
The first stage requires leaders to empathize with the security concerns of their adversaries by 
putting themselves in their shoes and understanding how their own actions may have made 
others feel insecure.  Booth and Wheeler define such a ‘security dilemma sensibility’ as: 
An actor’s intention and capacity to perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness 
towards, the potential complexity of the military intentions of others.  In particular, it refers to the 
ability to understand the role that fear might play in their attitudes and behaviour, including, 
crucially, the role that one’s own actions may play in provoking that fear.53 
The intention and capacity to exercise security dilemma sensibility requires leaders and diplomats 
to not only overcome their strongly held peaceful and defensive self-images, but also to translate 
such empathetic sensibilities into concrete steps that might build trust.  However, since policy 
makers worry that their assessment presuming that the other side has peaceful intentions might 
be wrong, they are likely to be reluctant to make the sort of concessions that would signal their 
trustworthiness but also leave them exposed if it turns out that they are facing an aggressor.54 
The risks of a unilateral trust-building initiative can be minimized by pursuing a graduated 
approach, such as suggested by the US psychologist Charles Osgood’s GRIT strategy.  Writing nine 
months before the superpowers came to the brink of nuclear war over the Soviet deployment of 
nuclear weapons to Cuba, Osgood had proposed that the United States could break the Cold War’s 
vicious cycle of suspicion and fear through a series of unilateral moves aimed at reducing the US 
threat to the Soviet Union.  In his view, significant unilateral concessions by one state could trigger 
reciprocation by the other, leading to a virtuous cycle of tension reduction and confidence 
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building.55  Osgood argued that reciprocity would justify bolder initiatives; otherwise, limited 
unilateral gestures of goodwill should continue to be made in the hope of triggering 
reciprocation.56  
GRIT suffers from three key limitations.  The first is the difficulty of justifying unilateral initiatives 
given particular forms of domestic opposition.  For example, in 1962 the Republican National 
Committee used an article by Osgood in The Liberal Papers for their campaign literature, calling 
the book as a whole “the Democratic plan for surrender” and Osgood’s contribution in particular 
as nothing short of “surrender on the installment plan.”57   
Secondly, it can be difficult to determine which moves will be sufficient in terms of their trust-
building potential to appear credible to the other state.58  Despite its intrinsic appeal to decision-
makers who are habitually risk-averse, this key limitation of GRIT – whether the moves are 
sufficiently reassuring to bring about changes in an adversary’s behavior, while at the same time 
avoiding exposure to high risks in the event that reciprocation is not forthcoming – makes it 
difficult to operationalize.   
Thirdly, this is especially the case when decision-makers in the state with whom an actor is trying 
to build trust discount the trusting signal as either a trick or a sign of weakness.  Even genuinely 
conciliatory moves can be misinterpreted if decision-makers in adversarial relationships operate 
with what Ole Holsti once called “an inherent bad faith model.”59 
An alternative to GRIT is what may be called a unilateral ‘leap of trust’, which is aimed at signaling 
trustworthiness to an adversary by a frame-breaking conciliatory move.60  This is clearly more risky 
than the GRIT strategy, but also more conducive to allowing governments to move from mutual 
suspicion to a relationship of trust.  However, even if a leap is successful in starting such a 
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relationship between leaders, the question arises whether this can be sustained by their 
successors.   
The prospects for maintaining trusting relationships in the face of leadership changes depend 
upon how far the habits and practices of trust have extended to the interaction between societies, 
what Booth and Wheeler called a condition of ‘embedded trust.’  It is the growth of such a new 
inter-societal collective identity that is crucial to assuring those “dependable expectations of 
peaceful change” that Deutsch viewed as the sine qua non of a security community.  In such a 
context, even if new leaders came to power intent upon restarting hostile power competition, a 
security community that was ‘embedded’ in the societies of its members would pose a powerful 
obstacle to such revisionism.61  
The European Community and ASEAN Compared 
Illustrative of how the concepts of trust-building have worked in practice are the cases of the 
European community and ASEAN. In the first, the transformation in Franco-German relations was 
crucial to the wider process of European integration.   
Initially, Europe’s path to becoming a ‘mature’62 security community depended crucially on 
achieving reconciliation between two old enemies, France and Germany, and what began this 
process was a decisive leap of trust by French and German leaders. French foreign minister, Robert 
Schuman, publicly launched on 9 May 1950 a Franco-German initiative to create a European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC). He argued that France and Germany could create a foundation for a 
new European federation by pooling the basic production of coal and steel through a 
supranational authority with the ability to make binding decisions.63  
There was a great deal of residual anxiety between the two countries. West German Chancellor, 
Konrad Adenauer, noted that French public opinion held Germany to be a greater threat to French 
security than the Soviet Union.64 In a rare display of security dilemma sensibility, Schuman in a 
personal letter wrote that whilst France feared German attack should Germany be able to 
economically recover, he also recognized that there might be a similar but opposite fear among 
Germans regarding the French.  As either state could observe the rearmament of the other for the 
purposes of war by the increased production of coal, iron and steel, this organization would help 
build trust by allowing each side to verify that the other was not turning its ploughshares into 
swords.65  
Despite the disillusionment created by the division of Europe because of the beginning of the Cold 
War, Schumann’s frame-breaking move “tapped a vein of hope and idealism which had been 
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buried even more deeply under the common earth of post-war history and associated a diplomatic 
initiative with a cause.”66  This started a process that allowed the French and German governments 
to put aside their differences, as had been prophesized in 1945 by the president of France’s 
provisional government, Charles de Gaulle, in his speech at Saarbrücken, where he insisted that 
“Frenchmen and Germans must let bygones be bygones, must work together, and must remember 
that they are European.”67 
The dramatic move of the ECSC did not immediately lead to the formation of a security 
community. The rejection in 1954 by the French National Assembly of the plan for the formation 
of a European Defense Community, which would have created an integrated European army, was 
a significant setback.  It demonstrated the need for further trust-building measures as the French 
were primarily concerned that the Germans would not be sufficiently constrained within such a 
community, particularly as they would outnumber the French.68   
It was fortunate, then, that the election in 1958 of Charles de Gaulle as French president brought 
to power for the second time a leader committed to building trust with his German counterpart.  
De Gaulle was aware of Adenauer’s suspicion that he might revert to his previously anti-German 
policies, epitomized by the Franco-Soviet treaty de Gaulle had engineered in 1944.69 To signal his 
good faith, de Gaulle invited Adenauer to his home at Colombey-les-Deux-Églises, an honor 
bestowed on no previous foreign politician.70 Extensive written communications between the two 
leaders followed, cementing their personal relationship. Although the process of reconciliation did 
not prevent the two states from having specific disagreements over aspects of their security 
policies,71 the 1963 Élysée Treaty (also known as the Friendship Treaty), conceived by de Gaulle to 
make “partnership with Germany not just acceptable, but popular with the French people,”72 
helped achieve this result. The achievement was remarkable, considering how deep-rooted the 
fear of Germany had been in the French popular as well as elite discourse only a decade earlier. It 
was reciprocated on the other side, lending support to the assessment of the Élysée Treaty as 
“Adenauer’s crowning achievement in his attempts to Europeanise the German people.”73 
How far this process of trust building had become embedded at the inter-societal level was 
reflected in a 1968 French public opinion poll, which showed that 74 per cent of the respondents 
no longer believed that wars between Germany and France would occur. Indeed, a plurality of 
surveyed French citizens identified the Germans as having the most congenial way of life of any 
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other people.74 Evidently, trust spilt over into societies as integration proceeded and 
communication intensified, thus serving as the lynchpin in the development and growth of a 
security community.  This allowed the two countries to move from a condition of ‘contingent 
cooperation’75 where trust is restricted to the leadership level to a condition of ‘embedded trust,’ 
where trust exists between societies, the latter being a necessary condition for a mature security 
community.76   
The process through which Franco-German rapprochement took place was certainly aided by 
historical factors that existed outside the agency of French and German leaders.  The onset of the 
Cold War and the formation of NATO provided important cover for France and Germany to engage 
in this trust-building process, partially by holding them together in a security institution backed by 
the power of the United States.  Steve Weber argues that the United States committed itself as a 
predominant actor in European politics in the 1950s in order to “reassure the French government 
that it would not face a Faustian choice between subservience to the Soviet Union and 
subservience to Germany.”77  He claims that the decision to promote NATO as a multilateral 
security institution had a very positive effect in the development of the European Community, 
which would have been far less likely had the United States alternatively decided to engage in 
bilateral agreements and decouple the security of France and Germany.78  Norrin Ripsman similarly 
noted that German rearmament within NATO was only approved by the French after both the 
United States and Great Britain gave guarantees that there would be no unilateral withdrawals of 
their troops from the continent.79  However, he also argues that the presence of NATO as an 
institution is not sufficient to explain the transformation in French and German attitudes.  Even 
with the organization’s purportedly reassuring presence, three successive French governments 
refused to send the European Defense Community to the National Assembly for ratification, 
before it was finally defeated there in 1954.80  Nevertheless, these explanations based on power 
politics and institutional frameworks miss the role that interpersonal dynamics between leaders, 
such as existed between de Gaulle and Adenauer, can play in producing dramatic transformations 
in interstate relations.81 
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Can the European achievement in trust building be replicated elsewhere?  How important to the 
European experience has been the fact that the members of the community, at the moment of 
their entry, have all been liberal-democratic states?  By contrast, the case of ASEAN is most 
pertinent because the grouping is an emergent security community where a degree of trust has 
developed between non-liberal states. It is particularly relevant to examining the dynamics of trust 
building among states that are fearful and suspicious of one another. 
ASEAN was formed in 1967 against a background of regional confrontation over disputed borders, 
especially between Indonesia and Malaysia.  The strategic environment of Southeast Asia at the 
time was very poor, being variously described as a ‘region of revolt’ or the ‘Balkans of the East.’82  
Moreover, the five founding members – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand – were “dissimilar in terms of their physical size, ethnic composition, socio-cultural 
heritage and identity, and in their colonial experience and postcolonial polities.”83  Although 
previous attempts at regional cooperation had failed, what came to unite the governmental elites 
was their shared commitment to anti-communism and their growing perception in the late 1960s 
that communist insurgencies in the region posed a common threat to their own political 
legitimacy.84   
ASEAN’s development as a security community has depended upon an incremental process of 
trust building.  This amounted typically to small cooperative moves, reciprocated by the other 
members of the organization.  There were no initial dramatic acts of trust building such as the 
formation of the ECSC in Europe.  Instead, most members of ASEAN clung to their colonial ties as a 
hedge against Indonesian dominance, even after the creation of the organization.  Several external 
events precipitated change.  In 1968 the United Kingdom accelerated its withdrawal from the 
region; a year later US President Richard Nixon similarly announced a doctrine of more limited 
involvement in the region.  Adding to these events was the emergence of China as a regional actor 
after the Cultural Revolution and subsequent Sino-Soviet disputes, the increase in Japanese 
economic power and the extension of the Vietnam War to Cambodia and Laos, all of which placed 
growing pressures on ASEAN to deepen security cooperation between its members.85 
A period marked by several years of debate within the organization resulted in the 1971 ZOPFAN86 
Declaration, which called on the state parties to broaden areas of cooperation and resist 
interference by ‘outside Powers.’  This was followed up in 1976 by the first meeting of the 
organization at heads of state and government level at which the leaders signed the Declaration of 
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ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia.  These two 
agreements stressed the unconditional sovereignty of the ASEAN states, the need for greater 
economic cooperation, and reiterated the principles of non-intervention, non-use of force, and 
peaceful settlement of disputes as the ones that bound members together.87  
 By establishing the rules and norms of permissible conduct, the TAC contributed to the growth of 
trust between ASEAN leaders.  It also helps to explain why despite divergent security perceptions 
there was relative unity over the threat from Vietnam, whose invasion of Cambodia in 1978 
became the dominant security challenge for the grouping.88  Singapore’s former Minister of 
Information and Arts, George Yeo, recalled in 1993 that “without the Vietnamese threat, it is 
doubtful that ASEAN would have become the regional grouping it is today.”89  Two years later, the 
admission into the grouping of the former enemy made possible by Hanoi’s withdrawal from 
Cambodia and the end of the Cold War provided an empirical test of ASEAN’s strength as a regime.   
Realism would argue that with the demise of the Vietnamese threat, the dynamics of self-help and 
power politics will reappear, eroding what trust the members of ASEAN had established. However, 
there is little evidence so far that this has been the case.  One plausible explanation for this is that 
the rising China replaced the role previously played by Vietnam in acting as a force for security 
cooperation within ASEAN, especially given the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.  Set 
against this, it is not evident that the apparent wish of ASEAN’s leaders to band together to 
balance Chinese power is necessarily an integrating force between its members.  The difficulty is 
that arms procured by one state to hedge against a future Chinese threat might increase the 
nervousness of other ASEAN members that such weaponry might eventually be used against 
them.90   
The trusting relationships that have developed between ASEAN diplomats have not been sufficient 
to overcome mistrust about each other’s future intentions.  As Malcolm Chalmers has argued, 
ASEAN states “still harbour concerns about future political trends.  Signs of arms builds [sic] in 
neighbouring states will, therefore, tend to encourage precautionary build-ups in response.”91  
Singapore’s contingency planning against Malaysia and the military skirmishes between Thailand 
and Cambodia over the disputed Preah Vihear territory have been examples.   
As Alan Collins argues in relation to Singapore’s strategic planning, “a defense strategy that entails 
seizing the territory of another member has no place in a security community.”92  Unlike in 
Western Europe, the fear that today’s partner might become tomorrow’s enemy reveals the limits 
of trust among the members of ASEAN.  The trust building process has clearly not yet led to the 
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emergence of a new collective identity supportive of a ‘no-war community’ in Deutsch’s sense.  At 
the same time, the development of ASEAN challenges the view which Jervis expressed in the 
1980s as to the fragility of security regimes in the face of the structural pressures to compete 
generated by an anarchic system. Instead, it tends to support an alternative social constructivist 
position which views participation in a regime as having the potential to create new identifications 
between states that can promote increased cooperation, and even trust.  For constructivists, the 
key focus is on how governments reconstitute their identities and interests in ways that promote 
trust and non-violent conflict resolution.   
ASEAN will only become a fully developed security community if a new collective identity becomes 
embedded at the inter-societal level as well as at the diplomatic level.  So, it seems more apt to 
classify it as a robust security regime.93  ASEAN’s transition to a mature security community depends, 
according to Collins, upon the elites’ willingness and ability to bring civil society into the policy-
making process.  The growth of civil society organizations within the members of ASEAN is an 
important step in building a security community because this will serve as a political check on the 
bellicosity of elites towards neighboring states.94  Developing a security community of this kind 
requires that new identifications emerge and be consolidated on a transnational basis.   
Conclusion 
States cope with the security dilemma inherent in the anarchical nature of the international 
system by using different approaches to reducing the risks of war, including collective security, 
common security and cooperative security. In theoretical terms, these approaches are all 
subcategories of security regimes. In practice, the problem facing states is how to create a 
successful security regime and transform it into a security community.  We argue that this 
necessitates overcoming fear and suspicion by developing new practices of trust building. In doing 
so, we can supplement the existing security community theorizing with a framework for 
understanding the conditions under which such practices are most likely to succeed. 
New trusting relationships will not arise solely from rational cost-benefit calculations, although 
giving actors incentives to cooperate helps in creating an environment conducive to trust, as 
exemplified by ASEAN.  What is crucial to any trust building endeavor is an awareness on the part 
of one or both actors that they might be trapped in a spiral of mutual hostility which neither side 
intended.  Exercising security dilemma sensibility of this kind is crucial if policy-makers are to risk a 
trusting move.  Of course, there will always be leaders who cannot be trusted under any 
circumstances or who are incapable of trusting other leaders.  Deciding when to trust and how to 
trust is the key challenge facing leaders.   
The chapter explored two trust-building strategies that governments might employ to signal their 
peaceful/defensive intent.  The first is some version of Osgood’s GRIT strategy and the second is 
the idea of a leap of trust.  All trust-building strategies involve the risk that a cooperative move will 
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be either pocketed or exploited, and these risks increase if governments seek to signal their 
trustworthiness through a frame-breaking move.  Yet, as illustrated by the process of Franco-
German rapprochement, leaders are sometimes able to make such a leap of trust which can 
overcome a history of violent conflict.  The risk of making trust-building moves should always be 
assessed against the alternative risk of falsely attributing malign intent to states with 
peaceful/defensive intentions. 
Even if decision-makers are successful in overcoming fear and distrust, the key challenge 
highlighted by the chapter is how to ensure that the process of trust-building both continues and 
deepens as new leaders come to power.  Only when both elites and societies develop trusting 
relationships across borders does war become ‘unthinkable’ among their states.  The chapter 
compared the experiences of Franco-German cooperation and ASEAN in this regard.  The former 
European case shows that action by political leaders can be decisive in both building trust and 
creating an environment in which trust can spill over into societies, thus making possible the 
growth of a mature security community, in which trust has become fully embedded.  The role that 
inter-societal integration played in developing the European security community shows that whilst 
elites have a key role to play in initiating trust building processes, their long-term success depends 
upon factors that go beyond their control.   
The ASEAN case, by contrast, indicates that the trusting relationships between ASEAN elites have 
not extended to their societies.  The resulting absence of embedded trust provides one 
explanation for why some ASEAN states continue to develop contingency plans for potential 
military conflict among themselves.  Nevertheless, ASEAN has developed a level of trust based on 
interpersonal links between leaders and diplomats within the organization which means that force 
is not viewed as a legitimate instrument of statecraft.  In this respect, ASEAN can be seen as 
extending beyond the limits of a Jervisian security regime, but not yet achieving the embedded 
trust required for a mature security community.  
ASEAN members need to overcome two primary problems in order for ASEAN to develop into a 
fully functioning security community where war becomes unthinkable between the members.  
First, member states, particularly those governments that are locked into disputes over territory 
and resources that could lead to violent conflict, need to recognize the importance of decisively 
signaling their trustworthiness, instead of relying on the incrementalism traditionally associated 
with the ASEAN approach.  The problem with the incremental path of trust building is that small 
signals of trustworthiness on the part of one government risk being dismissed as tokenism or even 
as feints whose purpose is to lull others into a false sense of security which can then be used to 
maximize advantage.   
The second precondition for ASEAN to develop into a mature security community is that ASEAN 
leaders must commit themselves to facilitating political, economic, and societal 
interconnectedness in ways that will ensure that trusting relationships at the elite level can spill 
over into interactions between societies.  This is a provocative conclusion for ASEAN elites who, 
albeit to varying degrees, have been reluctant in the past to embrace high levels of political 
pluralism.  The argument here is that achieving a situation of embedded trust depends upon much 
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higher levels of societal freedom within ASEAN states – thereby opening the door to increased 
levels of inter-societal integration - than has been the norm since the organization’s inception.  
This challenge goes beyond Southeast Asia and raises the question for elites in non-democratic 
polities everywhere whether they can advance the process of building regional security 
communities without unleashing democratic political forces that may challenge their hold on 
power. 
 
